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Constructing the Malware Distribution Networks.

To understand the properties of the web malware serving infrastructure on the Internet, we analyze the recorded network traces associated with the detected malicious URLs to construct the malware distribution networks. We define a distribution network as the set of malware delivery trees from all the landing sites that lead to a particular malware distribution site. A malware delivery tree consists of the landing site, as the leaf node, and all nodes ( i.e., web sites) that the browser visits until it contacts the malware distribution site (the root of the tree). To construct the delivery trees we extract the edges connecting these nodes by inspecting the Referer header from the recorded successive HTTP requests the browser makes after visiting the landing page. However, in many cases the Referer headers are not sufficient to extract the full chain. For example, when the browser redirection results from an external script the Referrer, in this case, points to the base page and not the external script file. Additionally, in many cases the Referer header is not set (e.g., because the requests are made from within a browser plugin or newly-downloaded malware).

To connect the missing causality links, we interpret the HTML and JavaScript content of the pages fetched by the browser and extract all the URLs from the fetched pages. Then, to identify causal edges we look for any URLs that match any of the HTTP fetches that were subsequently visited by the browser. In some cases, URLs contain randomly generated strings, so some requests cannot be matched exactly. In these cases, we apply heuristics based on edit distance to identify the most probable parent of the URL . Finally, for each malware distribution site, we construct its associated distribution network by combining the different malware delivery trees from all landing pages that lead to that site.



Our infrastructure has been live for more than one year, continuously monitoring the web and detecting malicious URLs. In what follows, we report our findings based on analyzing data collected during that time period. Again, recall that we focus here on the pervasiveness of malicious activity (perpetrated by drive-by downloads) that is induced simply by visiting a landing page, thereafter requiring no additional interaction on the client's part (e.g., clicking on embedded links). Finally, we note that due to the large scale of our data collection and some infrastructural constraints, a number longitudinal aspects of the web malware problem (e.g., the lifetime of the different malware distribution networks) are beyond the scope of this paper and are a subject of our future investigation.

Niels Provos 2008-05-13