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Best Student Paper

The attack surface concept provides a means of discussing the susceptibility of software to as-yet-unknown attacks. A system's attack surface encompasses the methods the system makes available to an attacker, and the system resources which can be used to further an attack. A measurement of the size of the attack surface could be used to compare the security of multiple systems which perform the same function.

The Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) has been in existence for over a decade. Relative to HTTP or SMTP, IMAP is a niche protocol, but IMAP servers are widely deployed nonetheless. There are three popular open source UNIX IMAP servers—UW-IMAP, Cyrus, and Courier-IMAP—and there has not been a formal security comparison between them.

In this paper, I use attack surfaces to compare the relative security risks posed by these three products. I undertake this evaluation in service of two complementary goals: to provide an honest examination of the security postures and risks of the three servers, and to advance the study of attack surfaces by performing an automated attack surface measurement using a methodology based on counting entry and exit points in the code.

On-line games are a rapidly growing Internet application. Because of the cost in supporting on-line games and the unpredictable load on servers, companies are moving toward sharing infrastructure for game hosting. To efficiently provision on-line games, it is important to understand game workloads and the behavior of game players. In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of a collection of on-line game players and game workloads using data from several sources including: a 13-month trace of an extremely busy game server containing over 2.8 million connections, a two-year trace of the aggregate game populations of over 500 on-line games, and a 4-month trace of a content-distribution network used to deliver games. The key findings from our measurement study are: (1) these gamers are an extremely difficult set of users to satisfy and unless game servers are properly set up and provisioned, gamers quickly choose to go elsewhere, (2) the popularity of these games follows a power law making games difficult to provision at launch time, (3) game workloads are predictable only over short-term intervals, (4) there are significant challenges in hosting games on shared infrastructure due to temporal and geographic synchronization across different games and other interactive applications, and (5) game software updates are a significent burden on game hosting that must be planned for. Our results have implications for both game publishers as well as infrastructure providers.

We describe our success in defeating the security of an RFID device known as a Digital Signature Transponder (DST). Manufactured by Texas Instruments, DST (and variant) devices help secure millions of SpeedPassTM payment transponders and automobile ignition keys.

Our analysis of the DST involved three phases:

1 Reverse engineering: Starting from a rough published schematic, we determined the complete functional details of the cipher underpinning the challenge-response protocol in the DST. We accomplished this with only ``oracle'' or ``black-box'' access to an ordinary DST, that is, by experimental observation of responses output by the device.

2 Key cracking: The key length for the DST is only 40 bits. With an array of of sixteen FPGAs operating in parallel, we can recover a DST key in under an hour using two responses to arbitrary challenges.

3 Simulation: Given the key (and serial number) of a DST, we are able to simulate its RF output so as to spoof a reader. As validation of our results, we purchased gasoline at a service station and started an automobile using simulated DST devices.

We accomplished all of these steps using inexpensive off-the-shelf equipment, and with minimal RF expertise. This suggests that an attacker with modest resources can emulate a target DST after brief short-range scanning or long-range eavesdropping across several authentication sessions. We conclude that the cryptographic protection afforded by the DST device is relatively weak

Advances in modern cryptography coupled with rapid growth in processing and communication speeds make secure two-party computation a realistic paradigm. Yet, thus far, interest in this paradigm has remained mostly theoretical.

This paper introduces Fairplay [28], a full-fledged system that implements generic secure function evaluation (SFE). Fairplay comprises a high level procedural definition language called SFDL tailored to the SFE paradigm; a compiler of SFDL into a one-pass Boolean circuit presented in a language called SHDL; and Bob/Alice programs that evaluate the SHDL circuit in the manner suggested by Yao in [39].

This system enables us to present the first evaluation of an overall SFE in real settings, as well as examining its components and identifying potential bottlenecks. It provides a test-bed of ideas and enhancements concerning SFE, whether by replacing parts of it, or by integrating with it. We exemplify its utility by examining several alternative implementations of oblivious transfer within the system, and reporting on their effect on overall performance.

We present the design and implementation of a framework for inspection, visualization, and modification of tcpdump packet trace files. The system is modularized into components for distinct application purposes, readily extensible, accessible through programmatic and graphical interfaces, and capable of handling trace files of arbitrary size and content. We include experiences of using the system in several real-world scenarios.

This paper describes a programming framework for clean construction of disk maintenance applications. They can use it to expose the disk activity to be done, and then process completed requests as they are reported. The system ensures that these applications make steady forward progress without competing for disk access with a system's primary applications. It opportunistically completes maintenance requests by using disk idle time and freeblock scheduling. In this paper, three disk maintenance applications (backup, write-back cache destaging, and disk layout reorganization) are adapted to the system support and evaluated on a FreeBSD implementation. All are shown to successfully execute in busy systems with minimal (e.g., less than 2%) impact on foreground disk performance. In fact, by modifying FreeBSD's cache to write dirty blocks for free, the average read cache miss response time is decreased by 12-30%. For non-volatile caches, the reduction is almost 50%.

We present the design, implementation, and evaluation of D-GRAID, a gracefully-degrading and quickly-recovering RAID storage array. D-GRAID ensures that most files within the file system remain available even when an unexpectedly high number of faults occur. D-GRAID also recovers from failures quickly, restoring only live file system data to a hot spare. Both graceful degradation and live-block recovery are implemented in a prototype SCSI-based storage system underneath unmodified file systems, demonstrating that powerful "file-system like" functionality can be implemented behind a narrow block-based interface.

BGP, the current inter-domain routing protocol, assumes that the routing information propagated by authenticated routers is correct. This assumption renders the current infrastructure vulnerable to both accidental misconfigurations and deliberate attacks. To reduce this vulnerability, we present a combination of two mechanisms: Listen and Whisper. Listen passively probes the data plane and checks whether the underlying routes to different destinations work. Whisper uses cryptographic functions along with routing redundancy to detect bogus route advertisements in the control plane. These mechanisms are easily deployable, and do not rely on either a public key infrastructure or a central authority like ICANN.

The combination of Listen and Whisper eliminates a large number of problems due to router misconfigurations, and restricts (though not eliminates) the damage that deliberate attackers can cause. Moreover, these mechanisms can detect and contain isolated adversaries that propagate even a few invalid route announcements. Colluding adversaries pose a more stringent challenge, and we propose simple changes to the BGP policy mechanism to limit the damage colluding adversaries can cause. We demonstrate the utility of Listen and Whisper through real-world deployment, measurements and empirical analysis. For example, a randomly placed isolated adversary, in the worst case can affect reachability to only 10% of the nodes.

A user-level operating system (OS) can be implemented as a regular user process on top of another host operating system. Conventional user-level OSes, such as User Mode Linux, view the underlying host operating system as a specific hardware architecture. Therefore, the implementation of a user-level OS often requires porting of an existing kernel to a new hardware architecture. This paper proposes a new implementation method of user-level OSes by using partial emulation of hardware and static rewriting of machine instructions. In this method, privileged instructions and their related non-privileged instructions in a native operating system are statically translated into subroutine calls that perform emulation. The translated instructions of the user-level OS are executed by both the real CPU and the partial emulator. This method does not require detailed knowledge about kernel internals. By using the proposed method, NetBSD and FreeBSD are executed as user processes on NetBSD and Linux. 

A fundamental problem in distributed computing environments involves determining whether a remote computer system can be trusted to autonomously access secure resources via a network. In this paper, we describe a means by which a remote computer system can be challenged to demonstrate that it is genuine and trustworthy. Upon passing a test, it can be granted access to distributed resources and can serve as a general-purpose host for distributed computation so long as it remains in contact with some certifying authority. The test we describe is applicable to consumer-grade computer systems with a conventional network interface and requires no additional hardware. The results of the test can be conveyed over an unsecured network; no trusted human intermediary is needed to relay the results. We examine potential attacks and weaknesses of the system and show how they can be avoided. Finally, we describe an implementation of a genuinity test for a representative set of computer systems.