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Best Student Paper

Lest We Remember: Cold Boot Attacks on Encryption Keys

Date: 
July 30, 2008 - 2:00 pm-3:30 pm
Authors: 
J. Alex Halderman::Princeton University
Seth D. Schoen::Electronic Frontier Foundation
Nadia Heninger::Princeton University
William Clarkson::Princeton University
William Paul::Wind River Systems
Joseph A. Calandrino::Princeton University
Ariel J. Feldman::Princeton University
Jacob Appelbaum
Edward W. Felten::Princeton University

Automatic Software Fault Diagnosis by Exploiting Application Signatures

Date: 
November 12, 2008 - 11:00 am-12:30 pm
Authors: 
Xiaoning Ding::The Ohio State University
Hai Huang::IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Yaoping Ruan::IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Anees Shaikh::IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Xiaodong Zhang::The Ohio State University

An Analysis of Data Corruption in the Storage Stack

An important threat to reliable storage of data is silent data corruption. In order to develop suitable protection mechanisms against data corruption, it is essential to understand its characteristics. In this paper, we present the first large-scale study of data corruption. We analyze corruption instances recorded in production storage systems containing a total of $1.53$ million disk drives, over a period of $41$ months. We study three classes of corruption: checksum mismatches, identity discrepancies, and parity inconsistencies. We focus on checksum mismatches since they occur the most.

We find more than 400,000 instances of checksum mismatches over the 41-month period. We find many interesting trends among these instances including: (i) nearline disks (and their adapters) develop checksum mismatches an order of magnitude more often than enterprise class disk drives, (ii) checksum mismatches within the same disk are not independent events and they show high spatial and temporal locality, and (iii) checksum mismatches across different disks in the same storage system are not independent. We use our observations to derive lessons for corruption-proof system design.

An important threat to reliable storage of data is silent data corruption. In order to develop suitable protection mechanisms against data corruption, it is essential to understand its characteristics. In this paper, we present the first large-scale study of data corruption. We analyze corruption instances recorded in production storage systems containing a total of $1.53$ million disk drives, over a period of $41$ months. We study three classes of corruption: checksum mismatches, identity discrepancies, and parity inconsistencies. We focus on checksum mismatches since they occur the most.