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7th USENIX Security Symposium, San Antonio, Texas

Finite-State Analysis of SSL 3.0

John C. Mitchell, Vitaly Shmatikov, and Ulrich Stern
Stanford University

Abstract

The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol is analyzed using a finite-state enumeration tool called Murtex2html_wrap_inline1336 . The analysis is presented using a sequence of incremental approximations to the SSL 3.0 handshake protocol. Each simplified protocol is ``model-checked'' using Murtex2html_wrap_inline1336 , with the next protocol in the sequence obtained by correcting errors that Murtex2html_wrap_inline1336 finds automatically. This process identifies the main shortcomings in SSL 2.0 that led to the design of SSL 3.0, as well as a few anomalies in the protocol that is used to resume a session in SSL 3.0. In addition to some insight into SSL, this study demonstrates the feasibility of using formal methods to analyze commercial protocols.
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Last changed: 12 April 2002 aw
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