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12th USENIX Security Symposium — Abstract

Pp. 1-14 of the Proceedings

Remote Timing Attacks Are Practical

David Brumley and Dan Boneh, Stanford University

Abstract

Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL. Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are practical and therefore security systems should defend against them.
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