Designing Trustworthy User-Agents for a Hostile Web

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About Eric...

- IE8 Program Manager Security
- IE7 PM Networking & Trust
- Developer of Fiddler, TamperIE, IEToys



IE 7 significantly reduced attack surface against the browser and local machine...

but...

- WebApp attacks (CSRF, XSS, ClickJacking, splitting) could become the next big vector of exploit.
- More high-value information is moving to the web.
- Social Engineering and exploitation of addons continues to grow.
- The Web platform itself is getting richer.
- and the next generation of attackers is coming out of grade school.

Worst of all, it turns out that crime does pay (quite well) after all.


Why is browser security so elusive?

Complexity.

The security architecture of the current web platform was largely an afterthought.

Maybe there's a shortcut?

We could block nearly 100% of exploits by removing just one component from the system...



Or, we could block a majority of exploits by removing a different component from the system...



So, if we re-architect everything, or get rid of the users, or get rid of the network, then security *might be* easy.

FAIL

Security is straightforward.


Tradeoffs are complicated.

Yes, Microsoft is a big, influential company...

...but the Internet is bigger.

- Many hundreds of millions of users...
- From all over the world...
- Visiting billions of web pages...
- And most don't really even know what a "browser" is!

The Web is surprisingly fragile.



For most web users, it's all about value.

The browser that most users will ask for...

Race car

The browser that meets users security expectations...

Amphibious assault tank

Bad guys only need to find one way in...



Security Team's Investments

Security Feature Improvements

 Create security features that address the top vulnerabilities today and in the future

Secure Features

- Reduce attack surface of existing code by closing legacy holes
- Apply security-focused rigors against new code

Provide Security and Compatibility

Users understand that improved security is a reason to upgrade

Threat Focus Areas

Address the evolving threat landscape


Browser & Add-on Vulnerabilities

Social Engineering

Web App Vulnerabilities







Browser/Add-on Vulnerabilities

ActiveX Gauntlet

Has control been flagged as unsafe?
ActiveX
Killbits

Safe for scripting / initialization

IObjectSafety


Is control
permitted to
run in browser
without
prompt?
AX Opt-in

Is control permitted to run on this site?

PerSite AX

Per-site ActiveX


Helps prevent repurposing of ActiveX controls





Data Execution Prevention

- Mitigates many memory-related vulnerabilities by blocking code execution
- Other protections like ASLR, SAFESEH, GS, etc.



Browser/Add-on Vulnerabilities

Protected Mode



Protected Mode

- Loosely-coupled IE enables one frame to host both Low and Medium tabs
- Intranet Zone moved to Medium Integrity by default
- Silent Elevation List split
- Minor API improvements
 - DWebBrowserEvents2::NewProcess
 - IE[Get|Set]ProtectedModeCookie
 - IERefreshElevationPolicy (IE7 GDR)
 - Other registry/filesystem helpers.




What's the best way to develop secure, performant, and reliable C/C++ code?



Don't.


Non-Binary Extensibility


Accelerators




WebSlices







Visual Search Suggestions





L33thaxor Cemo





Fake codecs and add-ons





Try as we might...

...we haven't figured out how to patch the user.

Group Policy Controls

"Don't ask my users to make security decisions."



For your security, some settings are controlled by Group Policy

Policies include:

- Treat certificate errors as fatal
- Block insecure content
- Prevent bypass of SmartScreen Filter warnings
- Regulate ActiveX control install & availability

IE8 includes over 1400 group policy controls.

What if we can't get rid of the user?

File Download - Security Warning



Do you want to run or save this file?



Name: zoneviewsetup.exe

Type: Application, 55.6KB

From: www.enhanceie.com

Run

Save

Cancel



While files from the Internet can be useful, this file type can potentially harm your computer. If you do not trust the source, do not run or save this software. What's the risk?



File Download - Security Warning



Do you want to run or save this file?



Name: zoneviewsetup.exe

Type: Application, 55.6KB

From: www.enhanceie.com

I'm Feeling Lucky

Cancel




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
A more effective warning?



SmartScreen Download Block



SmartScreen Block Page




Domain Highlighting



HTTPS - Extended Validation


- Supported by all modern browsers.
- Over 10,000 sites with extended validation certificates.



Social Engineering

International Domain Names


- Protects against homograph style phishing attacks
- Unicode display restricted to user's configured languages






HTTPS Mistakes


Insecure Login Form




Certificate Mismatch




Mixed Content - Prompt



Mixed Content Blocked




Mixed Content shown – No lock



Mitigating XSS

XSS Statistics



Source: WhiteHat Security, August 2008

XSS Threats

Researcher Bryan Sullivan: "XSS is the new buffer overflow."

- Steal cookies
- Log keystrokes
- Deface sites
- Misuse credentials
- Port-scan the Intranet
- Launch CSRF
- Steal browser history
- Abuse browser/AX vulnerabilities
- Evade phishing filters
- Circumvent HTTPS
- etc...



IE8 XSS Filter

Comprehensive XSS Protection

- Disable US-ASCII codepage
- Disable sniffing of UTF-7 codepage
- Fix other codepage-related bugs
- Disable CSS expression() in IE8 Standards mode
- Offer script-sanitization functions for sites building mashups

Securing Mashups

How are mashups built today?

- Cross-domain script inclusion
- IFRAMEs

```
<script type="text/javascript"
    src="http://syndication.example.com/pagead/show_ads.js">
</script>
```

XDomainRequest

- Enables web developers to more securely communicate between domains
- Provides a mechanism to establish trust between domains through an explicit acknowledgement of cross domain access
- Access-Control-Allow-Origin syntax standardized

HTML5 postMessage()

- Enables two domains to establish a trust relationship to exchange object messages
- Provides a web developer a more secure mechanism to build cross-domain communication
- Part of the HTML5 specification; supported by all latest-version browsers.

postMessage - Sending

postMessage - Listening

```
// Listen for the event. For non-IE, use
// addEventListener instead.
document.attachEvent('onmessage',
function(e) {
   if (e.domain == 'expected.com') {
       // e.data contains the string
       // We can use it here. But how?
   }
});
```

JavaScript Object Notation

```
{"Weather":
  "City": "Seattle",
  "Zip": 98052,
  "Forecast": {
    "Today": "Sunny",
    "Tonight": "Dark",
    "Tomorrow": "Sunny"
```

Native JSON Support

- JSON.stringify()
- JSON.parse()

Based on ECMAScript 3.1; natively supported by modern browsers.

window.toStaticHTML()

Client-side string sanitization, based on the Microsoft Anti-XSS Library.

```
window.toStaticHTML(
"This is some <b>HTML</b> with embedded
script following... <script>
alert('bang!'); </script>!"
);
```

returns:

```
This is some <b>HTML</b> with embedded script following...!
```


Putting it all together...

```
if (window.XDomainRequest) {
  var xdr = new XDomainRequest();
  xdr.onload = function() {
    var objWeather = JSON.parse(xdr.responseText);
    var oSpan = window.document.getElementById("spnWeather");
    oSpan.innerHTML = window.toStaticHTML(
"Tonight it will be <b>" +
objWeather.Weather.Forecast.Tonight +
"</b> in <u>" + objWeather.Weather.City + "</u>."
);
    };
  xdr.open("POST", "http://evil.example.com/getweather.aspx");
  xdr.send("98052");
```

MIME-Sniffing

- No upsniff from image/*
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- Option to force file save:

```
Content-Disposition: attachment;filename="file.htm";
X-Download-Options: NoOpen
```



Best Practices

- Filter content using the Microsoft Anti-Cross Site Scripting Library.
- Use JSON, toStaticHTML for local content sanitization
- Specify encoding using in the Content-Type header:
 - Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
- Use XDomainRequest and postMessage() rather than using <SCRIPT SRC=>
- Use HTTPOnly cookies
 Set-Cookie: secret=value; httponly



Design Flaws in the Web Platform

Privacy

File Upload Control

Text input control now read-only

```
C:\Secret\Pin-42\File.zip Browse...
```




Server no longer gets full filename:


```
Content-Disposition: form-data;
name="file1"; filename="File.zip"
```

Local JavaScript sees a fixed path for compatibility:

```
file1.value == "C:\fakepath\File.zip"
```

Enhanced Cleanup





Preserve Favorites website data

Keep cookies and temporary Internet files that enable your favorite websites to retain preferences and display faster.

InPrivate™

InPrivate™ Browsing

Shared PC privacy

 Browsing leaves no tracks locally (cookies, DOMStorage, cache, history, etc)

InPrivate™ Filtering

Awareness and control of web profile aggregation


- Assess, on an ongoing basis, user exposure to thirdparty content.
- Helps to prevent information disclosure by automatically blocking high-frequency third-party content from sites users visit.

InPrivate™ Browsing



Background on 3rd Party Aggregation

- Over time, users' history and profiles can be surreptitiously aggregated
 - Any third-party content can be used like a tracking cookie
 - There is little end-user notification or control today
 - Syndicated photos, weather, stocks, news articles; local analytics, etc....
 - Unclear accountability with third party security & privacy policies



Are we finished yet?



Questions?

ericlaw@microsoft.com



http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/tags/Security/default.aspx

XSS Filter

