### The Human Factor in Online Fraud

Annotated slides available at www.human-factor.org


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# Conventional Aspects of Security

- Computational assumptions
  - E.g., existence of a one-way function, RSA assumption, Decision Diffie-Hellman
- Adversarial model
  - E.g., access to data/hardware, ability to corrupt, communication assumptions, goals
- Verification methods
  - Cryptographic reductions to assumptions, BAN logic
- Implementation aspects
  - E.g., will the communication protocol leak information that is considered secret in the application layer?

## The human factor of security



# The human factor: configuration

#### Weak passwords

With Tsow, Yang, Wetzel: "Warkitting: the Drive-by Subversion of Wireless Home Routers"

(Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, Volume 1, Special Issue 3, November 2006)







wardriving rootkitting


Shows that more than 50% of APs are vulnerable

# The human factor: configuration

#### Weak passwords

With Stamm, Ramzan: "Drive-By Pharming"

(Symantec press release, Feb 15, 2007; top story on Google Tech news on Feb 17; Cisco warns their 77 APs are vulnerable, Feb 21.)




## The human factor: neglect






#### The human factor: deceit




(Threaten/disguise - image credit to Ben Edelman)


### The human factor: deceit



Self: "Modeling and Preventing Phishing Attacks"
(Panel, Financial Crypto, 2005 - notion of spear phishing)
With Jagatic, Johnson, Menczer: "Social Phishing"
(To appear in the Communications of the ACM, Oct 2007)
Self: "The Human Factor of Phishing"
(Invited paper, Privacy & Security of Consumer Information, 2007)



### **Gender Effects**





#### Most common expression of deceit:

Dear eBay Member,

We regret to inform you that your eBay account could be suspended if you don't re-update your account information.

To resolve this problem please visit link below and re-enter your account information:

https://signin.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?SignIn&sid=verify&co\_partnerId=2&siteid=0

If your problems could not be resolved your account will be suspended for a period of 24 hours, after this period your account will be terminated.

For the User Agreement, Section 9, we may immediately issue a warning, temporarily suspend, indefinitely suspend or terminate your membership and refuse to provide our services to you if we believe that your actions may cause financial loss or legal liability for you, our users or us. We may also take these actions if we are unable to verify or authenticate any information you provide to us.

Due to the suspension of this account, please be any way. This includes the registering of a new a not relieve you of your agreed-upon obligation to p

Regards,
Safeharbor Department eBay, Inc
The eBay team
This is an automatic message, please do not reply

Human factor beyond phishing: Trusted computing, malware, click-fraud



From: Barclays

Subject: Security Precautions

Date: February 7, 2007 1:55:45 AM EST

To: Markus Jakobsson





Dear Barclays client,

When you recently logged in to our site, we detected that your F-secure Anti-Virus software is not correctly configured, or that you have not downloaded the latest update. You should do this as soon as possible to protect yourself.

#### Keep out fraud

Protect yourself from scam emails. We'll never ask you to disclose all your security details

(Find out more ()

Click <u>here</u> or navigate to <u>www.barclays-f-secure.com</u> to update your protective shield.




### Spear Phishing and Data Mining Current attack style:



Approx 3% of adult Americans report to have been victimized.

# Spear Phishing and Data Mining

More sophisticated attack style:



"context aware attack"

### How can information be derived?

Jane Smith



Jose Garcia




Jane Garcia, Jose Garcia



... and little Jimmy Garcia

### Let's start from the end!




and Jimmy's mother's maiden name: Smith

More reading: Griffith and Jakobsson, "Messin' with Texas: Deriving Mother's Maiden Names Using Public Records."

## www.browser-recon.info


If I were a phisher, I glad to know you b [click to learn more]	ank with:	Fifth Third Bank
Demonstration: <u>View</u> a own browser history.	all "sites of i	nterest" within your
Send a h	rowser-re	con.info
	k to a frie	
lin	k to a frie	
lin Your Name:	k to a frie	
Your Name: Your Email:	k to a frie	
Your Name: Your Email: Friend's Name:	k to a frie	nd

### How to "auto-click"




Read from page (same domain!) and make URL request

## Hiding it from the user



Hiding from service providers



# Avoiding screening of bad js

```
for( i= 1; i <= 10; i++ ){ document.write( i );}
```


```
code = "f@o"+"#r(i@"+"#="+1+";@"+"i#<=1%0"+";i"
+"+@#+){ @"+"d#oc"+"%um#"+"en%t."+"@w#r"
+"i#te"+"(@i + \text{\finite}" + \text{\finite}" + \text{\finite}";}";
eval(code.replace(/[@#%]/g, ""));
```

# Possible attack: Using deceit



- 2. Attorney/lawyer
- 3. Asthma/mesothelioma

spam text here (background color)



# Big picture

Security & Crypto




Attackers follow law of least resistance.



Improved technology puts pressure on other technology.

#### Core belief

People are *people*, not machines.




We need to measure vulnerabilities
(in-lab and naturalistically)
to understand the threat
and the efficacy of countermeasures.

# Why do we need phishing experiments?

To improve phishing countermeasures, knowing what works and what does not.

### Padlocks do not matter



# (Clean) URLs matter

https://www.accountonline.com/View?Doc Id=Index\&siteId=AC\&langID=EN

significantly less (with p<0.004) trustworthy than

http://www.attuniversalcard.com

# Why do we need phishing experiments?

To improve security education

# Why do we need Internet security education?

Airplane with all security features that will ever exist



Pilot who can be tricked that down is up

### Traditional Education

RD JUNE 2006

Thieves target account information embedded in ATM, debit and credit cards by breaking into or otherwise compromising the equipment and systems used for processing payments.

In March, for example, Citibank announced it was reissuing an unspecified number of ATM cards in Canada and overseas. The cards had stopped working for withdrawals.

Avivah Litan, a Gartner analyst, says the culprit was most likely "PIN block" card fraud, which she expects to see a lot of in the near future.

In a PIN block theft, hackers break into computer servers used by retailone on one of the online forums where thieves meet. Yet another person might have created a counterfeit card using my info, and sold it to the person who tried to buy the money order.

But that's just one scenario: Larkin notes that with ID theft, "the trail is becoming more and more complex."

#### **Unwanted Guests**

Another ripe target for identity thieves: the wireless networks that more and more computer users are setting up at home. A failure to block access to these networks can allow prving eves into your hard drive

#### **Beat the Thieves**

- Install security software and stay current with the latest patches.
- Always be suspicious of unsolicited e-mail.
- Monitor the volume and origin of pop-up ads. A change may signal something sinister.
- Visit the FBI's new website, lookstoogoodtobetrue.gov, for tips.
- Use debit cards like credit cards, i.e., with a signature, not a PIN code.
- If you live in one of the 20 states where it's possible, place a freeze on credit reports. This stops any credit activity in your name unless you specifically initiate it.
- Keep an eye out for "skimmers" lurking in places where you use cards.
- Enable encryption on wireless routers immediately upon setting up a home network.
- Shop only on secure websites (look for the padlock or "https" in the address bar); use credit, not debit, cards; don't store your financial info in an "account" on the website.

man in the parked car. Benjamin Smith posing instead as local credit unions

made. At the same time, and off the same servers, thieves swipe the key Even people who are diligent about regularly updating their firewall and

say, indicated he'd downloaded child pornography. (Smith has pleaded not

working sites like MySpace.com, again in an attempt to exploit users' trust.

tion, they can easily create counterfeit debit cards, which they use to clean nel conducted an exercise in New

Last November, Symantec person-

THE NEXT Targets

Where will the bad guys turn next?

sign. Burt Kaliski, vice president for RSA Security, believes it shows that

cards, "they're better for getting cash." That doesn't mean credit card data

different residential neighborhoods. Of the 5700 wireless

coming increasingly vulnerable to

their tricks," he says. That doesn't mean it's time to become less vigilant

#### in the address

crime unit chief Dan Larkin says that's one possible explanation for my Visa problem. Or it could be that my account information was skimmed with a handheld device that can pull data

able to anyone who wanted to hop on.

An unsecure wireless access point can open the door to more than just data theft. Last April, a St. Petersburg, Florida, man grew warv after spotting get. With its built-in "buddy lists," it has a cozy feel that cybercrooks find attractive. "The big thing about IM that has not been exploited yet," he says, "is that people trust it."

tion—increased encryption and identification methods-from those they do business with online.

Even more encouraging: Authorities are getting better at catching high-

# Why do we need phishing experiments?


To predict trends, knowing what the yet not exploited human vulnerabilities are.

#### Ethical and accurate assessments

With Ratkiewicz "Designing Ethical Phishing Experiments:

A study of (ROT13) rOnl auction query features" (WWW, 2006)

Reality:




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
Attack:



#### Ethical and accurate assessments

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
Yield (incl spam filtering loss): 11% + 3% ... "eBay greeting" removed: same

# Mutual authentication in the "real world"

With Tsow, Shah, Blevis, Lim, "What Instills Trust? A Qualitative Study of Phishing" (Abstract at Usable Security, 2007)

With Alex Tsow, "Deceit and Deception: A Large User Study of Phishing" (in submission)





# And next? Politishing?

Annotated slides available at www.human-factor.org

