Check out the new USENIX Web site.

Home About USENIX Events Membership Publications Students
Security '03 Paper    [Security '03 Technical Program]

next up previous
Next: Introduction

Analyzing Integrity Protection in the SELinux Example Policy

Trent Jaeger Reiner Sailer Xiaolan Zhang

IBM T. J. Watson Research Center
Hawthorne, NY 10532 USA
Email: {jaegert,sailer,cxzhang}@us.ibm.com


Date:

Abstract:


In this paper, we present an approach for analyzing the integrity protection in the SELinux example policy. The SELinux example policy is intended as an example from which administrators customize to create a policy for their site's security goals, but the complexity of the model and size of the policy make this quite complex. Our aim is to provide an access control model to express site security goals and resolve them against the SELinux policy. Ultimately, we aim to define a minimal trusted computing base (TCB) that satisfies Clark-Wilson integrity, by first testing for the more restrictive Biba integrity policy and resolving conflicts using Clark-Wilson semantics. Our policy analysis tool, Gokyo, implements the following approach: (1) it represents the SELinux example policy and our integrity goals; (2) it identifies conflicts between them; (3) it estimates the resolutions to these conflicts; and (4) provides information for deciding upon a resolution. Using Gokyo, we derive a proposal for a minimal TCB for SELinux includes 30 subject types, and we identify the work remaining to ensure that TCB is integrity-protected. Our analysis is performed on the SELinux example policy for Linux 2.4.19.




next up previous
Next: Introduction
Trent Jaeger
2003-05-11

This paper was originally published in the Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Security Symposium, August 4–8, 2003, Washington, DC, USA
Last changed: 27 Aug. 2003 aw
Technical Program
Security '03 Home
USENIX home