

Sybil-resilient online content voting

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Sybil defense is hard

- Open system \rightarrow an attacker can join easily
- Lack of strong identity → an attacker can join with many fake accounts
- Need some resource that cannot be acquired in abundance

- Links in a social network?

Social links are hard to acquire in abundance



SumUp: a Sybil-resilient vote aggregation system



- SumUp's setting: A central party collects all votes and the social graph
- Goal: extract a subset of votes
 - Include few votes from Sybils
 - Include most votes from honest users

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SumUp overview

- Design insights
 - 1. Designate a vote collector
 - 2. Use max-flow to collect votes
 - 3. Assign appropriate link capacities

#1: Designate a vote collector



#2: Use max-flow to collect votes



#2: Use max-flow to collect votes



#3: Assign appropriate link capacities



SumUp's design details

- Capacity assignment
- Leverage user feedback to reduce bogus votes

Capacity assignment

- Assign link capacity to collect at most v votes
 - Ideally v is the number of honest votes
- Assign greater capacity to edges that are closer to the vote collector

Assign capacity via ticket distribution



Assign capacity via ticket distribution



Assign capacity via ticket distribution



Approximate v to # of honest votes

- Observation
 - When number of honest votes ≫ v, number of collected votes ≈ v
 - When number of honest votes ≪ v, number of collected votes ≪ v
 - Not many bogus votes are collected

Setting v

- Iteratively adjust v:
 - 1. Start with a small v = 100

2. Collect votes using current v

- 3. If # of collected votes > 0.5^*v , double v and repeat step 2
- Final v approximates number of honest votes regardless of attacks

SumUp's provable properties

- Limit bogus votes
 - When v ≪ n, expected bogus votes per attack edge is 1+ o(1)
 - Even when $v = \Theta(n)$, expected bogus votes per attack edge is O(log n) [SybilLimit IEEE S&P'08]
- Collect a large fraction of honest votes
 - On a random graph, ~100% honest votes can be collected

Leverage user feedback on votes

- If vote collector can tag some votes as bogus, SumUp can do better:
 - Reduce capacity on attack edges close to the collector
 - Possibly ignore attack edges
- Idea: penalize all links along the path taken by the bogus vote [Ostra NSDI'08]

Associate a penalty with each link



Reassign capacity according to penalty



Reassign capacity according to penalty



Eliminate links with high penalty



Evaluation

- 1. How does SumUp perform on real social networks?
- 2. Can SumUp detect Sybil attacks?

Simulation setup

- Use 3 social networks
 - YouTube (0.5 million nodes)
 - Flickr (1.5 million nodes)
 - Synthetic (3 million nodes)
- Inject 100 attack edges randomly
- Use a random vote collector
- Choose a random set of honest voters

SumUp limits number of bogus votes



SumUp collects most honest votes



Evaluate SumUp on Digg



Evaluating SumUp on Digg

- Kevin Rose (Digg founder) \rightarrow vote collector
- Run SumUp for all votes cast before the article is marked as "popular"
- Normal articles \rightarrow fraction of votes collected > 0.7
- Suspicious articles \rightarrow fraction of votes collected $\ll 0.7$

Suspicious articles have evidence of attack

- ~800 suspicious articles have less than 50% votes collected by SumUp
- Manually sampled 30 articles
- Found (subjective) evidence of attacks in 15 the articles
 - 1 article is an advertisement
 - 10 articles have many newly registered voters
 - 4 articles receive < 50 votes after marked "popular"

Examples of suspicious articles



An example of suspicious articles with no evidence of attack



Suspicious articles receive more negative votes



 Obtained negative votes for 5794 "popular" articles from 08/2008 to 09/2008

Related work

- Node admission
 - SybilGuard [Sigcomm'06], SybilLimit [IEEE S&P'08], SybilInfer [NDSS'09]
- Fighting spam
 - Ostra [NSDI'08]
- User reputation systems
 - SybilProof [P2PEcon'05], Appleseed [ISF'05], Advogato[SSYM'98]
- Content voting systems
 - Credence [NSDI'06]

Conclusion

- Defending against Sybil attacks is important for content voting systems
- SumUp vote aggregation:
 - 1. Limit # of bogus votes by # of attack edges
 - 2. Collect many votes from honest users
 - 3. Ignore votes from attackers that repetitively cast bogus votes