Tumbling Down the Rabbit Hole:

Exploring the Idiosyncrasies of Botmaster Systems in a Multi-Tier Botnet Infrastructure

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Our Work

- Forensic investigation of botmaster components
- Interpreting functionality and management using <u>network traces</u> and <u>file-system artifacts</u>
 - Obtained through ISP cooperation



Purpose

- Refine notions of how advanced botnets are deployed and managed
- Reveal mechanisms and techniques to perform malicious activities
- Expose the systems in the highest tiers, providing a complete view of Waledac's infrastructure



Overview

- Context
- Topology
- Components and Deployment
- Activities, Operations, and Management



Context

- Waledac: a successor to Storm
- Emerged mid-2008
- Multi-tier architecture, single-tier peering
- Leveraged for spamming, data harvesting, and phishing




Waledac's Components

- Botmaster-deployed systems (1:6* ratio):
 - UTS (single system)
 - TSLs
- Infected-host tiers (1:7* ratio)
 - Repeater Layer
 - Spammer Layer



Topology

4 layers, 2 sections





Infected-Host Tiers

layers 3 and 4

- Roles
 - Local data harvesting, spamming
 - HTTP proxying, fast-flux DNS
- Communication
 - HTTP-based, similar to Storm
 - Limited P2P functionality
 - Certificates + AES



TSLS

layer 2

- Purpose
 - Hide UTS from Repeaters
 - Initiate targeted spam campaigns
- Configuration
 - CentOS
 - ntp, BIND, PHP, nginx, proxychains
 - src (package archives) and pack (specific configs)
 - php_mailer



UTS

layer 1

- Purpose
 - Autonomous C&C
 - Credentials repository
 - Hosts binaries and bootstrap lists
 - Monitors population, vitality statistics
 - Affiliates interface (FairMoney)
 - Interacts with underground 3rd parties (spamit.com, j-roger.com)
- Configuration
 - CentOS
 - Flat-files, no central DB
 - CLI



Audit Methodology

@UTS layer

- <u>ERP</u>- <u>Executable Request Proxy</u>
 - Is a repeater hosting a particular file?

request

GET /readme.exe HTTP/1.0 Host: 99.56.197.58

reply

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/0.8.5
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2009 09:26:11 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Connection: close
Content-Length: 2
Last-Modified: Sun, 26 Jul 2009 10:49:55 GMT
Accept-Ranges: bytes

MZ

- <u>DR</u> <u>Domain Response</u>
 - Can a repeater resolve hellohello123.com?
 - A fast-flux domain without a .com TLD entry




Third-Party Repacking

@UTS layer

- crypt.j-roger.com and cservice.j-roger.com
- UTS sends a POST to:
 /api/apicrypt2/[16 hexadecimal digit hash]
 ...followed by a binary to repack
- Repacked binaries returned in ~4 seconds
- 157 binaries repacked during a 2-hour observation



Monitoring@UTS





nginx Config

@TSL layer

```
location /mr.txt {
     proxy pass http://85.x.x.x/lm/data/hosting/mr.txt;
     proxy redirect off;
     proxy set header Host $host;
     proxy set header X-Real-IP $remote addr;
location /pr/ {
     proxy pass http://85.x.x.x/lm/data/hosting/partnerka/;
     proxy redirect off;
     proxy set header Host $host;
     proxy set header X-Real-IP $remote addr;
location / {
     if ($http_user_agent !~ (.+)LMK$) {
          error page 403 404 500 502 503 504 /404.html;
          return 404;
     proxy pass http://85.x.x.x/lm/data/hosting/;
     proxy redirect off;
     proxy set header Host $host;
     proxy set header X-Real-IP $remote addr;
location ~ ^/[a-z]*\.(png|htm)$ {
     if ($http user agent !~ (.+)LMK$) {
          error page 403 404 500 502 503 504 /404.html;
          return 404;
     rewrite ^/[a-z]*\.(png|htm)$ /lm/main.php last;
location /lm/ {
     if ($http user agent !~ (.+)LMK$) {
          return 404;
          error page 403 404 500 502 503 504 /404.html;
                    http://85.x.x.x/lm/;
     proxy pass
     proxy redirect off;
     proxy set header Host $host;
     proxy set header X-Real-IP
                                   $remote addr;
```

/mr.txt - list of repeater nodes; used for targeted spam proxying

/pr/ - partnerka; interface to obtain binaries; access affiliates program

/lm/ - access to the UTS control scripts



Affiliates

partnerka

- The FairMoney system
- Developers create <u>multiple versions</u> of binaries with <u>different affiliate IDs</u>
- Distribution (URLs) handled by 3rd parties
- Pricing based on downloads and lifetime



Activities

malicious throughput

- Differentiated spamming
 - High and Low quality (HQS/LQS)
 - Authenticated and targeted v. bulk
- Data harvesting
 - Network traffic (winpcap)
 - HDD Scanning (email regex)




Differentiated Spamming

- HQS (High Quality Spam)
 - Utilizes credentials to send authenticated mail(SMTP-AUTH)
 - 'test' campaign
- LQS (Low Quality Spam)
 - Autonomous, bulk, sent by spammer tier
 - Transmission success statistics are reported



LQS


low quality spam





HQS

high quality spam





Challenging Notions

- Differentiated Spamming
- 3rd-Party Repacking
- Node Auditing





