

# deSEO: Combating Search-Result Poisoning

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
# The malware pipeline

find vulnerable web servers

compromise web servers and  
host malicious content


spread malicious links via  
email, IM, search results

bad stuff



# The malware pipeline

- Malware links spread through:
  - spam emails, spam IMs, social networks, search results, etc.
- We look at *search results*





[Advanced Search](#)  
[Language Tools](#)

Google Search

I'm Feeling Lucky

You'll laugh. You'll cheer. You'll actually like tech demos. [Demo Slam](#)

[Advertising Programs](#)

[Business Solutions](#)

[About Google](#)

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
# Is this really a problem?

- ~40% of popular searches contain at least one malicious link in top results
- Scareware fraud made \$150 m. in profit last year

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- S y st



The screenshot shows a Stack Overflow question titled "Is XP antivirus 2009 compatible with Vista?". The question is asked by a user named "Κολοπαιδ..." and asks if XP antivirus 2009 can be transferred to a new Vista computer. The question has three answers, with the first one marked as the "Best Answer" by the asker. The best answer states that all trojan and viruses are compatible with all windows platforms.

**Is XP antivirus 2009 compatible with Vista?**

I got a new computer running windows Vista but I already paid for XP antivirus 2009 on my old computer. Will I be able to transfer it to my new one or is only compatible with windows XP?

3 years ago [Report Abuse](#)

**Additional Details**

I have paid \$50 for that program and I'm going to use it if I can.  
3 years ago

Can you also give me the link to re download it because they didn't send me a CD  
3 years ago

please help me I google it but all I can find is remove instructions not the link to download it. help I'm losing my \$50  
3 years ago

---

**Best Answer** - Chosen by Asker

Well, since you insist to use it, yes all trojan and viruses are compatible with all windows platforms.

3 years ago [Report Abuse](#)

# Contributions

- How does the search poisoning attack work?
  - examined a live attack involving 5,000 compromised sites
- What can we learn about such attacks?
  - identified common features in search poisoning attacks
- How can we defend against them?
  - developed deSEO, which detected new live SEO attacks on 1,000+ domains

# Anatomy of SEO attack

search engine



compromised  
Web server



redirection  
server



exploit  
server



# Anatomy of SEO attack

search engine



search query



compromised  
Web server



redirection  
server



exploit  
server

# Anatomy of SEO attack


search engine



search query



compromised Web server




redirection server



exploit server


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search engine




# Anatomy of SEO attack

search engine



# Anatomy of SEO attack

search engine



# Analysis of an attack

- Examine a specific attack
  - August - October 2010
  - 5,000 compromised domains
  - Tens of thousands of compromised keywords
  - Millions of SEO pages generated

# How are servers compromised?

- Sites running osCommerce
- Unpatched vulnerabilities
- Allows attackers to host any file on the Web server - including executables

[www.example.com/admin/file\\_manager.php/login.php?  
action=processuploads](http://www.example.com/admin/file_manager.php/login.php?action=processuploads)

# What files are uploaded?

Uname: Linux srv32.000webhost.com 2.6.18-128.1.10.el5 #1 SMP Thu May 7 10:39:21 EDT 2009 i686 [exploit-db.com] Windows-1251

User: 99 ( nobody ) Group: 99 ( ? ) Server IP: 216.108.239.153

Php: 5.2.10 Safe mode: OFF [ phpinfo ] Datetime: 2010-10-12 01:15:00 Client IP: 67.188.94.229

Hdd: 456.48 GB Free: 34.80 GB (7%)

Cwd: /home/a3447405/public\_html/images/ drwxrwxrwx [ home ]

[ Sec. Info ] [ Files ] [ Console ] [ Sql ] [ Php ] [ Safe mode ] [ String tools ] [ Bruteforce ] [ Network ] [ Self remove ]

### File manager

Name	Size	Modify	Owner/Group	Permissions	Actions
[ .. ]	dir	2010-06-24 01:15:53	3447405/99	drwxr-x---	RT
[ .cch ]	dir	2010-10-12 00:13:59	99/99	drwxrwxrwx	RT
[ .news ]	dir	2010-10-12 01:09:00	99/99	drwxrwxrwx	RT
[ banners ]	dir	2009-10-20 07:06:38	3447405/3447405	drwxr-xr-x	RT
[ default ]	dir	2009-10-20 07:06:40	3447405/3447405	drwxr-xr-x	RT
[ dvd ]	dir	2009-10-20 07:06:52	3447405/3447405	drwxr-xr-x	RT
[ gt_interactive ]	dir	2009-10-20 07:06:56	3447405/3447405	drwxr-xr-x	RT
[ hewlett_packard ]	dir	2009-10-20 07:07:02	3447405/3447405	drwxr-xr-x	RT
[ icons ]	dir	2009-10-20 07:07:08	3447405/3447405	drwxr-xr-x	RT



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[ gt_interactive ]	dir	2009-10-20 07:06:56	3447405/3447405	drwxr-xr-x	RT
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- php shell to manage file operations

# What files are uploaded?




The screenshot shows a web-based file manager interface. At the top, there is a status bar with system information: "Uname: Linux srv32.000webhost.com 2.6.18-128.1.10.el5 #1 SMP Thu May 7 10:39:21 EDT 2009 i686 [exploit-db.com]", "User: 99 ( nobody ) Group: 99 ( ? )", "Php: 5.2.10 Safe mode: OFF [ phpinfo ] Datetime: 2010-10-12 01:15:00", "Hdd: 456.48 GB Free: 34.80 GB (7%)", and "Cwd: /home/a3447405/public\_html/images/ drwxrwxrwx [ home ]". On the right side, there is a "Windows-1251" dropdown menu and "Server IP: 216.108.239.153" and "Client IP: 67.188.94.229". Below the status bar, there are several tabs: "[ Sec. Info ]", "[ Files ]", "[ Console ]", "[ Sql ]", "[ Php ]", "[ Safe mode ]", "[ String tools ]", "[ Bruteforce ]", "[ Network ]", and "[ Self remove ]". The main area is titled "File manager" and contains a table with the following columns: "Name", "Size", "Modify", "Owner/Group", "Permissions", and "Actions".

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- php shell to manage file operations
- HTML templates, images

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
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- php shell to manage file operations
- HTML templates, images
- php script to generate SEO web pages

# The main php script

[www.example.com/images/page.php?page=kobayashi+arrested](http://www.example.com/images/page.php?page=kobayashi+arrested)

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```
<?php
//Obfuscation provided by FOPO - Free Online PHP Obfuscator v1.2: http://www.fopo.com.ar
$haad7a3c599d="\x62\x141\x73\x145\x36\x64\x5f\x144\x65\x143\x6f\x144\x65";@eval($haad7a3c599d(
"JGdiY2ZhZjlmOTNhNjgwMDgxODE0ODU0OGVlOTc1OWRlPSJceDYyIjskajBiNGJmOTUwNmE1Y2F1ZmY4Mj djODc
xNDQ2ZjFkODk9I1x4NjUiOyRlNGZiNTU0N2YxZmU5YzY1YmNiNTIxZWJkMmViYjQwNj0iXHg2NiI7JHM2OWIyNGI
yZDJhNmVkYmExYTc0MjA2NzIyYmRkNWRiPSJceDY3IjskZDk2YzViYTViNzYwY2Y5Y2Q1M2U4MGU3OTc5MzFjMjU
```

- Obfuscated script
- Simple encryption using nested *evals*

# The main script (de-obfuscated)

```
1 <?php
2 global $hta;
3 if(!file_exists("./hta.cfg")) $hta = false;
4 else $hta = true;
5 @mkdir("./.news");
6 @chmod("./.news", 0777);
7
8 function crawl_page($url) {
19
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34
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60
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66
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84
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106
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Generate page for keyword



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Fetch:  
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Cache page

# Dense link structure

- Other compromised domains found by crawling included links
- Each site linked to 200 other sites
- ~5,000 compromised domains identified
- Each site hosted 8,000 SEO pages
  - **40 million** pages total

# Poisoned keywords

- 20,000+ popular search terms poisoned

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Google  
trends

Tip: Use commas to compare multiple search terms.

## Examples

[assisted living](#)

[jcrew.com](#), [landsend.com](#), [eddiebauer.com](#), [abercrombie.com](#)

[carmen electra](#), [pamela anderson](#)

[washingtonpost.com](#), [drudgereport.com](#)

[bedbugs](#)

[imdb.com](#)

## Hot Searches (USA)

1. [pga championship](#)
2. [nickjr](#)
3. [powerball](#)
4. [powerball numbers](#)
5. [rick perry](#)
6. [statue of liberty](#)
7. [florida lottery](#)
8. [george lopez](#)
9. [rebecca black friday](#)
10. [powerball results](#)

# Poisoned keywords

- 20,000+ popular search terms poisoned



Google  
trends

Search Trends



bing

justin bieber



Web

Web Videos Images News Music Shopping More

RELATED SEARCHES

Justin Bieber And  
Selena Gomez Break  
Up


1. Justin Bieber CSI Arrest
  2. Justin Bieber Kissing
  3. Justin Bieber Baby Lyrics
  4. Justin Bieber Music Videos
  5. Justin Bieber Cuts His Hair
- Justin Bieber Selena Gomez Pregnancy

ALL RESULTS

1-10 of 676,000 results · [Advanced](#)

[Videos of justin bieber](#)

Discover videos of **justin bieber** with Bing Video Search




Justin Bieber -  
Never Say Never ft.  
YouTube



Justin Bieber - U  
Smile  
YouTube



Justin Bieber - One  
Time  
YouTube 4:02



Justin Bieber -  
Never Let You Go  
YouTube 4:25

More

[Justin Bieber Home | Download Justin Bieber Music & MP3 | Official ...](#)

Justin Bieber website featuring all the latest music, mp3, tour information, blog, news and videos from the teen sensation.

# Poisoned keywords

- 20,000+ popular search terms poisoned
- Google Trends + Bing related searches
  - *haiti earthquake*
  - *senate elections*
  - *veterans day 2010*
  - *halloween 2010*
  - *thanksgiving 2010...*




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  - *thanksgiving 2010...*
- 95% of Google Trends keywords poisoned


# Redirection servers

- Three domains used for redirection
- Over 1,000 exploit URLs fetched



# Redirection servers

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Almost 100,000 victims over 10 weeks

# Evasive techniques

- Why can't redirection behavior be easily detected?
  - Cloaking
  - Requiring user interaction
  - Redirection through javascript or flash

# What are prominent features in search poisoning?

- Dense link structure
- Automatic generation of relevant pages
- Large number of pages with popular keywords
- Behavior of compromised sites
  - *before* - diverse content and behavior
  - *after* - similar content and behavior

# What are prominent features in search poisoning?

- ~~Dense link structure~~
- ~~Automatic generation of relevant pages~~
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# deSEO steps

## 1. History-based filtering

select domains where many new pages are set up,  
different from older pages

## 2. Clustering suspicious domains

using K-means++

## 3. Group similarity analysis

select groups where new pages are similar across  
domains



Sample web URLs with  
trendy keywords

[http://www.askania-fachmaerkte.de/images/news.php?  
page=justin+bieber+breaks+neck](http://www.askania-fachmaerkte.de/images/news.php?page=justin+bieber+breaks+neck)





Sample web URLs with  
trendy keywords



History based detection



Sample web URLs with trendy keywords



History based detection



Domain clustering

-lexical features of URLs

*String features-*


keyword separators, arguments, filename, path

*Numerical features-*

number of arguments, length of arguments, length of keywords

*Bag of words-*

set of keywords



Sample web URLs with trendy keywords





History based detection



Domain clustering

-lexical features of URLs



Group analysis

-web page feature similarity



Sample web URLs with trendy keywords






History based detection




Domain clustering

-lexical features of URLs



Group analysis

-web page feature similarity







web URLs with  
keywords

based detection

clustering

-lexical features of URLs





`.*\xmlrpc\.php\?showc=\w+(\+\w+)+$`

Sample web URLs with trendy keywords

History based detection

Domain clustering

-lexical features of URLs

Group analysis

-web page feature similarity

Regular expressions


-to match URLs not in our sample

# deSEO findings

- 11 malicious groups from sampled web graph in January 2011
  - 957 domains
  - 15,482 URLs
- Revealed a new search poisoning attack
  - compromised Wordpress installations
  - cloaking to avoid detection
  - different link topology

# Applying to search results

- 120 keyword searches in Google and Bing
  - 163 malicious URLs detected in results
  - 43 search terms affected





# Conclusion

- Malware and SEO are big problems
- Analyzed an ongoing scareware campaign
  - Identified thousands of compromised domains
- Identified prominent features in SEO attacks and used them to build deSEO
  - Promising results on a partial dataset from bing
  - Identified multiple live SEO attacks

# Thank You

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