

NetReview: Detecting when interdomain routing goes wrong



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Motivation

YouTube outage underscores big Internet problem

YouTube outage underscores big Internet problem
BGP data intended to block access to YouTube within Pakistan was accidentally broadcast to other service providers, causing a widespread YouTube outage

By Robert McMillan, IDG News Service
February 26, 2008

Sunday's inadvertent disruption of Google's YouTube video service underscores a flaw in the Internet's design that could some day lead to a serious security problem, according to networking experts.

Developers on steroids
Save months building custom Web apps with application generation


The issue lies in the way ISPs share BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) routing information. BGP is the standard protocol used by routers to find computers on the Internet, but there is a lot of BGP routing data available. To simplify things, ISPs share this kind of information among each other.

BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) routing

- This is just the **tip of the iceberg**
- A considerable fraction of Internet prefixes is affected by routing problems every day



BGP and its problems



- ASes exchange routing information via BGP
- BGP routing is plagued with many problems:
 - Misconfigurations, bugs, attacks by spammers, instabilities, hijacks, oscillation, equipment failures, policy conflicts, ...



Approach: Fault detection

- **Goals:**

1. Reliably detect each routing problem, and
2. link it to the AS that caused it

- **Benefits:**

- ASes can respond to problems quickly
- No need to diagnose faults manually
- Works for a very broad class of problems
- Provides an incentive for reliable routing
- Easy to deploy incrementally




Challenges in BGP fault detection

- **Idea:** Upload all router logs to a central entity, who inspects them for problems
 - Sufficient to find almost any routing problem
- Why wouldn't this work in practice?
 - **Privacy:** Logs contain sensitive information
 - **Reliability:** Logs may be inaccurate (bugs, hackers)
 - **Automation:** Can't manually inspect that much data
 - **Deployability:** Can't assume global deployment
 - **Decentralization:** ASes wouldn't accept a single detector entity



NetReview from 10,000 feet



- Border routers maintain **logs** of all BGP messages
 - Logs are **tamper-evident** → can reliably detect & obtain proof if faulty routers omit, forge, or modify log entries
- Neighbors periodically **audit** each other's logs and check them for routing problems
 - If a problem is found, auditor can prove its existence to a third party



Outline


- Introduction
 - Motivation: Internet routing problems
 - Approach: Fault detection
- What is a BGP fault?
- The NetReview system
- Practical challenges
- Evaluation
- Summary



What is a BGP fault?

- **Expected behavior** of the AS := Combination of its peering agreements, best practices, internal goals, ...


- **BGP fault** := The BGP messages sent by the AS do not conform to its expected behavior



- How do we know what BGP messages the AS sent?
 - Need a complete+accurate message trace even if some routers are faulty in arbitrary, unknown ways
 - Requires a **robust+secure tracing mechanism**
- How do we know what its expected behavior is?
 - Different for every AS → need a **specification**



BGP rules



- For example, D might specify the following:
 - "I will filter out routes with excessive paths" (best practice)
 - "I will act as C's provider" (peering agreement)
 - "I will prefer routes through B, if available" (internal)
- Some rules may be confidential, but the AS need not reveal all of them to each auditor




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
The tamper-evident log



- Based on the tamper-evident log in PeerReview [SOSP'07]
 - If router omits, modifies, or forges entries, neighbors can detect this and obtain evidence
- Log entries form a hash chain
 - Messages include signed hash
 - Tampering breaks the hash chain and is thus detectable
- Messages are acknowledged
 - Detects if message is ignored
- Neighbors gossip about the hash values they've seen



Writing rules




Describes everything that S-BGP
can check, and more!

$\forall a \forall p \forall r \in \text{outRIB}(a, p, \cap[t-40, t]) : \underline{(|\text{as_path}(r)| = 1 \wedge \text{prefix}(r) \in \text{ownPrefixes})} \vee (\exists a' \exists p' \exists r' \in \text{inRIB}(a', p', \cup[t-40, t+5]) : \text{prefix}(r) = \text{prefix}(r') \wedge \text{startsWith}(r, r') \wedge (\forall n \in r-r' : n \in \text{ownPrefixes}))$

- Rules are predicates on the AS's routing state
 - Declarative; easy to get correct
 - Even simple rules can be very powerful



Auditing and rule evaluation



■ To audit a neighboring AS:

1. Auditor requests the logs from each border router
2. Auditor checks logs for inconsistencies and tampering
3. Auditor locally replays the logs → series of routing states
4. Auditor evaluates the rules over each routing state
5. If a rule is violated during some time interval, auditor extracts verifiable evidence from the logs




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- Practical challenges
 - Incentives for incremental deployment
 - Partial deployment
 - Working without a certificate authority
 - Using existing routers
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Incremental deployment



- What is the smallest useful deployment?
 - One AS can find bugs, misconfigurations, ...
 - Two adjacent ASes can check peering agreements, ...
- What are the incentives for deployment?
 - Reliable ASes can attract more customers
 - Logs can be used for root-cause analysis




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Experimental setup



- Synthetic network of 35 Zebra BGP daemons
- Default routing policies (Gao-Rexford)
- Injected real BGP trace (Equinix) to get scale
- Results in this talk are from AS 5 (92% of Internet ASes have degree five or less)



Evaluation: Functionality check

- Fault injection experiment with five rules based on common routing problems:
 - No origin misconfiguration
 - Export customer routes
 - Honor NO_ADVERTISE community
 - Consistent path length
 - Backup link
- NetReview detected all the injected faults
 - Also produced diagnostic information, such as time when the fault occurred, and prefixes that were affected



Evaluation: Overhead

- Processing power: 15-minute log segment can be checked in 41.5s on a P4
 - A **single commodity PC** is sufficient for small networks
- Storage space: 710kB/minute, ≈ 356 GB/year
 - Fits comfortably on a **single hard disk**
- Bandwidth: 420kbps, including BGP updates
 - **Insignificant** compared to typical traffic volume



Related Work

- **Fault prevention**
 - Secure routing protocols: S-BGP, soBGP, SPV, ...
 - Trusted monitors: N-BGP
- **Heuristic fault detection**
 - Anomaly detection
 - Root-cause analysis
- **Accountability**
 - PeerReview, AIP, AudIt, ...



Summary

- NetReview: A **fault detection system** for interdomain routing
 - Automatically detects a wide variety of routing problems
 - Links each problem to the responsible AS
 - Not a heuristic - produces proof of each fault
- NetReview is **practical**
 - Easy to deploy incrementally
 - No PKI required
 - Reasonable overhead

Thank you!